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Business Ethics
In early 2006, search-engine giant Google struck a deal with the People’s Republic of China and launched Google.cn, a version of its search engine run by the company from within China. Launching Google.cn required Google to operate as an official Internet Service Provider (ISP) in China, a country whose Communist government requires all ISPs to self- censor, removing content that is considered illegal from search results.
From a financial perspective, China represented for Google a dynamic and fast-growing, though increasingly competitive, market. Google’s decision to self-censor Google.cn attracted significant ethical criticism at the time. The company’s motto is “Don’t Be Evil,” and prior to entering China, Google had successfully set itself apart from other technology giants, becoming a company trusted by millions of users to protect and store their personal infor- mation. The choice to accept self-censorship, and the discussion and debate generated by this choice, forced Google to re-examine itself as a company and forced the international community to reconsider the implications of censorship.
This case was prepared as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either the effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
Prepared by Kristina Wilson, Yaneli Ramos, and Daniel Harvey under the
supervision of Professor Wayne Norman (edited by Professor Chris MacDonald)
“The Great Firewall”
GOOGLE IN CHINA
“While removing search results is inconsistent with Google’s mission, providing no information (or a heavily degraded user experience that amounts to no information) is more inconsistent with our mission.”
- Google senior policy counsel Andrew McLaughlin.”^1
Introduction
In early 2006, search-engine giant Google struck a deal with the People’s Republic of China and launched Google. cn, a version of its search engine run by the company from within China. Launching Google.cn required Google to operate as an official Internet Service Provider (ISP) in China, a country whose Communist government requires all ISPs to self-censor, removing content that is considered illegal from search results. Such censored content ranges from political subjects such as “democracy” and “Tibet,” to religious subjects such as “Falun Gong” (a spiritual movement banned by the government) and “the Dalai Lama,” to social subjects like “pornography.” By choosing to launch Google.cn, Google seemed to be implying that its mission and values could be consistent with self- censorship in China.
From a financial perspective, China represented for Google a dynamic and fast-growing, though increasingly competitive, market. With over 105 million users online in early 2006, China’s Internet market was the second in size only to that of the United States, but it still represented only about 8% of the Chinese population. Though Google’s U.S.-based site, Google.com, had been available in China since the site’s inception in 1999, service was slow and unreliable due to extensive Chinese government censoring of international content. Google’s major U.S. competitors, Yahoo! and Microsoft MSN, had each entered the Chinese market as ISPs years earlier, agreeing to self-censor. In addition, escalating competition from Chinese search engine Baidu.com was quickly eroding Google. com’s Chinese market share: between 2002 and 2007, Baidu.com’s market share increased from a mere 3%^2 to a dominant 58%.^3
Google’s decision to self-censor Google.cn attracted significant ethical criticism at the time. The company’s motto is “Don’t Be Evil,” and prior to entering China, Google had successfully set itself apart from other technology giants, becoming a company trusted by millions of users to protect and store their personal information. However, in early 2006, Google found itself in front of the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, defending its actions in China side by side with Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Cisco Systems. Google’s choice to accept self-censorship, and the discussion and debate generated by this choice, forced Google to reexamine itself as a company and forced the international community to reconsider the implications of censorship.
Google and its Mission
History and Services^4
Google is the world’s largest search engine. Founded in 1998 by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two Stanford graduate students, Google began as a college research project. While at Stanford, the founders created an innovative technology that would analyze webpages and retrieve the most pertinent information for any given search query.
(^1) Oliver, C & Shinal, J. “Google will censor new China service”. MarketWatch. (January 25, 2006). (^2) Thopmpson, C. “Google’s China Problem (And China’s Google Problem)”. The New York Times Magazine (April 23, 2006): LexisNexis. Duke University Library. 6 Nov. 2007. (^3) Liu, J. “Baidu and Google at logger heads in China; Business Asia by Bloomberg”. International Herald Tribune (July 26, 2007): LexisNexis Duke University Library. 6 Nov. 2007. (^4) “Milestones”. Available from www.google.com. Accessed on November 4, 2007.
China, Censorship, and the Golden Shield Project
History
China has been playing a game of catch-up in recent years, attempting to modernize and become a larger player in the global market. As it attempted, and eventually succeeded in, entering the World Trade Organization, China was forced to open its markets to foreign companies, granting “unprecedented access to the Chinese market.”^9 During this period of increased foreign access, companies within China started demanding more advanced telecommunications, as well as modern infrastructure. The Chinese government agreed that modernization was necessary, and so quickly began to finance this modernization, making the nation one of “the world’s largest consumers of telecommunications equipment.”^10 However, China’s acquisition of more modern forms of information technology leads not only to increased trade and communication flow out of the country, but into the country as well. The flow of information into the country is what concerns China’s Ministry of Public Service (hereafter referred to as MPS), whose responsibility statement says:
The responsibilities of public security agencies in China include: the prevention, suppression and investigation of criminal activities; fight against terrorist activities; maintenance of social security and order; fight against behaviors jeopardizing social order... security and inspection of public information networks.^11
These responsibilities include policing the expression of certain ideas and the acquisition of sensitive information. As Collings notes,
In February 1996, all private subscribers to Chinanet, the main Internet service provider, run by the state telecommunications monopoly, were required to register with the Public Security Bureau, provide the government with detailed personal information about themselves, and sign a pledge not to “read, copy or disseminate information that threatens state security.”... In addition to the state-run Chinanet, all Internet service providers were required to take steps to filter out anything deemed harmful.^12
As part of their effort to keep up with the more advanced information networks being put in place, “Chinese authorities are keen to acquire new technologies that will serve to increase their surveillance capabilities.”^13 As the new millennium began, the MPS started to implement these new technologies in its censorship activities, using them to restrict access to ideas and information that are outlawed in China.
The Golden Shield Project
In early 2000, the MPS introduced its new system, the Golden Shield project, which aimed to use state-of-the-art technology as a means of more effectively policing the Chinese people. Although this technology is used to monitor everything from video to voice to Internet traffic, controlling the flow of information over the Internet is the focus of this case.
(^9) Foreign Policy in Focus. http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n38china.html. (^10) Walton, G. (2001). China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China. Canada: Rights and Democracy. Online: http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/CGS_ENG.PDF (^11) Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal. http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/02/content_74192.htm. (^12) Collings, A. Words of Fire. (New York: New York University Press, 2001). 187. (^13) Walton, G. (2001). China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China. Canada: Rights and Democracy.
To control the information flowing over the Internet, the MPS has installed, not firewalls exactly,^14 but a content- filtering system that works similarly to parental control systems that can block out specific material. A story in The New York Times Magazine describes the system this way:
There are three main fiber-optic pipelines in China, giant underground cables that provide Internet access for the public and connect China to the rest of the Internet outside its borders. The Chinese government requires the private-sector companies that run these fiber-optic networks to specially configure “router” switches at the edge of the network, where signals cross into foreign countries. These routers – some of which are made by Cisco Systems, an American firm – serve as China’s new censors.^15
Once the “firewall” checks to see if the sites being searched are blacklisted or not, it next utilizes a “censorship system that uses a keyword blacklist and routers that reach deep into Internet traffic to find forbidden words or phrases”^16 on the sites being searched. This, combined with the fact that those in China know that all of their Internet activities are being monitored, instills fear of imprisonment and limits the influx of information that the Chinese government finds objectionable.^17 However, the system still only blocks out information coming from outside the country. Peer-to-peer and internal servers are able to avoid the filters.
Controversy has arisen because the Chinese government’s system fails to prevent access to all content they deem inappropriate. To tighten the net further, and prevent Chinese Internet users from accessing prohibited subject matter available on servers within the country, China has asked providers of Internet services with local outfits to remove contentious material and to censor their own customers. Additionally, “[f]or companies inside its borders, the government uses a broad array of penalties and threats to keep content clean.”^18 This is required of text- messaging services, search engines, and blogging sites and provides the ultimate way for the Chinese government to block content within the country without having to create more difficult-to-implement censorship systems.^19
Backing up all of these censorship mechanisms is the constant threat of imprisonment or other hostile reaction to violations of the censorship laws. This fear keeps both Internet users and service providers vigilant in censoring their own actions within China. In some cases, Internet users even get very pointed reminders that their government is exercising control over their Web-surfing habits. Consider the following official announcement:
Starting today, when netizens visit all the main portals of Shenzhen city, Guangdong, they will see two cartoon figures “Junghing” and “Chacha” (Jing Cha = Police). The image of Shenzhen Internet Police will officially be online. From now on, when netizens visit websites and web forums of Shenzhen, they will see these two cartoon police images floating on their screen^20 (see Appendix III).
(^14) Einhorn, B. “The Great Firewall of China”. BusinessWeek. (September 23, 2002): LexisNexis. Duke University Library. 3 Nov. 2007. (^15) Thompson, C. “Google’s China Problem (And China’s Google Problem)”. The New York Times Magazine. (April 23, 2006). (^16) “Toppling the Great Firewall of China.” eWeek. (September 12, 2007): NA. Academic OneFile. Gale. Duke University Library - Perkins. 3 Nov. 2007. (^17) Ibid. (^18) Thompson, C. “Google’s China Problem (And China’s Google Problem)”. The New York Times Magazine. (April 23, 2006). (^19) Einhorn, B & Elgin, B. “THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA; How a vast security network and compliant multinationals keep the mainland’s Net under Beijing’s thumb”. BusinessWeek. (January. 23, 2006): LexisNexis. Duke University Library. 3 Nov. 2007. (^20) Qiang, X. “Image of Internet police: JingJing and Chacha online - Hong Yan (??)”. chinadigitaltimes.net. (January 22, 2006).
Making the Decision to Expand into China
Given the commercial potential of the expanding Chinese market and Google’s decrease in Chinese market share between 2002 and 2006, it was imperative for Google to make decisions about whether to escalate operations in China at the price of having to self-censor.
To begin the discussion, Google had to make the business opportunity clear. The case was put this way, in February 2006, by Elliot Schrage, Vice President, Global Communications and Public Affairs, Google Inc.:
There is no question that, as a matter of business, we want to be active in China. It is a huge, rapidly growing, and enormously important market, and our key competitors are already there. It would be disingenuous to say that we don’t care about that because, of course, we do. We are a business with stockholders, and we want to prosper and grow in a highly competitive world.^33
However, since expanding into China would require Google to self-censor its content on behalf of the communist Chinese government, clearly more was at stake in this decision than potential commercial gain. Co-founder Sergey Brin was born in the Soviet Union and said that “having felt that kind of oppression, I would never have wanted to compromise in that direction.”^34 In order to analyze the potential options, Google developed an analytical framework based on its corporate mission. In the words of Vice President Elliot Schrage:
Google’s objective is to make the world’s information accessible to everyone, everywhere, all the time. It is a mission that expresses two fundamental commitments:
(a) First, our business commitment to satisfy the interests of users , and by doing so to build a leading company in a highly competitive industry; and
(b) Second, our policy conviction that expanding access to information to anyone who wants it will make our world a better, more informed, and freer place.
Some governments impose restrictions that make our mission difficult to achieve, and this is what we have encountered in China. In such a situation, we have to add to the balance a third fundamental commitment:
(c) Be responsive to local conditions^35
To understand Google’s decision, it is important to examine the nexus of user interests, the expansion of access to information, and unique local conditions in China.
In terms of satisfying user interests, Google prides itself on providing a high-quality user experience. After the Chinese government’s 2002 Internet censorship crackdown, the Google.com experience for a user in China was no longer of high quality. Google.com generated search results extremely slowly because, regardless of the terms searched, each search had to pass through the elaborate “Great Firewall of China” censoring system. As a site hosted outside of China, and not within the Great Firewall itself, Google.com took a particularly long time to load search results, as compared to search engines hosted in-country like Baidu.com or Yahoo! China. Moreover,
(^33) Schrage, E., Vice President, Global Communications and Public Affairs, Google Inc., “Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations.” (February 15, 2006). (^34) Brin, Sergey, quoted by Hannah Clark. “The Google Guys in Davos.” Forbes.com. (January 1, 2007). (^35) Schrage, E., Vice President, Global Communications and Public Affairs, Google Inc., “Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations.” (February 15, 2006). Bold text included by Mr. Schrage.
Chinese users found that Google.com was down over 10% of the time; Google News was never available; and Google Images was available only 50% of the time.^36
Another important concern related to user interests is the importance of user privacy. In early 2006, just as Google was planning to launch Google.cn, it became known that Yahoo! China had turned over private user e-mail data to the Chinese government and that this had led to the ten-year, eight-year, and four-year prison sentences of Chinese cyberdissidents Shi Tao, Li Zhi, and Jiang Lijun. In addition, Microsoft had recently shut down the blog of famous Chinese political blogger Michael Anti (a penname for Zhao Jing) at the request of the Chinese government.^37 Clearly any decision made by Google to enter China would have to take into account concerns about user privacy and government surveillance.
In terms of expanding access to information, it was Google’s position that due to the poor quality of Google.com for users in China after 2002, Google was in fact not providing the population of China with good access to information. As Google, Inc., Senior Policy Council Andrew McLaughlin put it:
Filtering our search results clearly compromises our mission. Failing to offer Google search at all to a fifth of the world’s population, however, does so far more severely. Whether our critics agree with our decision or not, due to the severe quality problems faced by users trying to access Google.com from within China, this is precisely the choice we believed we faced.^38
Finally, in terms of local conditions, it was important for Google to determine to what extent self-censoring would affect the company’s search results. For users of Google.com in China, searches for censored subject matter, ranging from political subjects like “democracy” and “Tibet” to religious subjects like “Falun Gong” and “Dalai Lama” to social subjects like “pornography”, would generate the same list of links as would be generated for a user based in the United States. However, if the user in China tried to open any censored links, either the user’s browser would shut down or the user would be re-directed to a non-censored site.
As noted earlier, the “Great Firewall of China” censorship system is complex and depends largely on intimidation and fear tactics to elicit vigorous self-censorship on both the corporate and the individual level. No official list of banned terms exists. Before launching Google.cn, the company estimated that fewer than 2% of all search queries in China would result in pages that would have to be censored.^39
In early 2006, a study by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School shed light on the extent and effectiveness of China’s censorship initiatives. According to the Center’s study, the Chinese state was able to block 90% of websites about the “Tiananmen massacre,” 31% of sites about independence movements in Tibet, and 82% of sites with a derogatory version of the name of former President Jiang Zemin.^40 This study serves to show that as of 2006, Chinese censorship was effective, though not total, and that information was available, though on a limited scale.
(^36) McLaughlin, A. Senior Policy Counsel, Google Inc., “Google in China.” The Official Google Blog. (January 27, 2006). (^37) Kristof, N.D. “China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo”. The New York Times. (February 19, 2006) (^38) Kristof, N.D. “China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo”. The New York Times. (February 19, 2006) (^39) Schrage, E., Vice President, Global Communications and Public Affairs, Google Inc., “Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations.” (February 15, 2006). Bold text included by Mr. Schrage. (^40) Kristof, N.D. “China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo”. The New York Times. (February 19, 2006)
methods along with the Chinese government’s method to come up with its own self-censoring system. Leach replied, “So if this Congress wanted to learn how to censor, we’d go to you – the company that should symbolize the greatest freedom of information in the history of man?”^46
Due to this hearing and others – and particularly in light of Yahoo! China and Microsoft MSN’s collusion with the Chinese government, which put three Chinese cyberdissidents in jail in Yahoo!’s case and which shut down a popular political bloggers MSN blog space in Microsoft’s case – in October 2007 the House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously voted in favor of the Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, which prohibits U.S. companies from disclosing to foreign governments the names and information of specific individuals using a given company’s services.^47 The Committee has urged Congress to act with alacrity and pass the Act as soon as possible.
In addition to the U.S. government, Google had to explain its actions to its shareholders. In May 2007, a majority of Google shareholders voted against an anti-censorship proposal which was submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of New York City on behalf of various New York City pension funds which own Google stock (see Appendix II for the full proposal). Google as a company, along with Google’s Board of Directors, recommended stockholders to vote against the proposal. In the words of David Drummond, Senior Vice President for Corporate Development, “Pulling out of China, shutting down Google.cn, is just not the right thing to do at this point, but that’s exactly what this proposal would do.”^48
Google in China Two Years Later
In the two years following the launch of Google.cn in January 2006, Google has done well in the Chinese market, remaining second only to Baidu.com in terms of market share. As of the second quarter of 2007, Google had increased its share from 19.2% to 22.8% and Baidu.com had fallen from a 63.7% to a 58.1% share.^49
In order to penetrate the China search market further, Google aims to make Google.cn as “Chinese” as possible, both by hiring Chinese employees and by partnering with Chinese technology firms. According to CEO Eric Schmidt, one of Google’s “big projects” during the year 2007 is to grant greater autonomy to Google’s local management in China. Google has tried to distinguish Google.cn as distinctly Chinese by adopting the local Chinese name of “Guge,” which roughly translates to “harvest song,” though this name choice has been widely mocked by Chinese users. Overall, Schmidt says, “As [Google] China gets more established, it will have its own voice, its own expression and, I think, its own look.”^50 Already Google has established two research centers, one in Beijing and one in Shanghai.^51
Since launching Google.cn, the company has set up key partnerships with Chinese firms that should help Google increase its Chinese market share. In early 2007, Google.cn set up a partnership with China Mobile, the government-owned dominant mobile-phone carrier in China, to manage the firm’s mobile Internet search services.^52 Also in early 2007, Google.cn partnered with the Chinese music and video sharing YouTube-like site Xunlei.com.^53
(^46) Ibid (^47) PEN American Center. “House Foreign Affairs Committee Unanimously Passes Global Online Freedom Act.” (October 23, 2007). (^48) Larkin, E. “Google Shareholders Vote Against Anti-Censorship Proposal”. PC World. (May 10, 2007). (^49) Litterick, D. “Google takes a byte out of the Chinese market”. The Daily Telegraph (London). (August 21, 2007). (^50) Dickie, M. “Google feels upbeat about China market”. Financial Times (London, England). (April 30, 2007) (^51) “Google Adds Local Partner.” Chinadaily.com.en. (August 21, 2007). Poon, T. “Google to Open Research Center in Shanghai”. The Wall Street Journal. (June 15, 2007). (^52) Barboza, D. “Google Makes Another Investment in the Internet in China”. The New York Times. (January 6, 2007). (^53) Barboza, D. “Google Makes Another Investment in the Internet in China”. The New York Times. (January 6, 2007).
In April 2007, Google announced a deal with China Telecom, the world’s largest wireless telecommunications and broadband services provider.^54 Finally, in August 2007 Google.cn entered into a partnership with Tianya.com, a Chinese online community.^55
Overall, while Google.cn remains far behind Baidu.com, the company is optimistic. In the words of Schmidt, “We were late entering the Chinese market and we are catching up. Our investment is working and we will eventually be the leader.”^56
(^54) Liu, John. “Google and China Telecom agree on Internet ad sales deal; Business Asia by Bloomberg”. The International Herald Tribune. (April 26, 2007). China Telecom Corporation Limited. http://www.chinatelecom-h.com/eng/corpinfo/overview.htm Accessed Nov. 2007. (^55) “Google Adds Local Partner.” Chinadaily.com.en. (Aug. 21, 2007). (^56) Dickie, M. “Google feels upbeat about China market”. Financial Times (London, England). (April 30, 2007)
Zi Yang (in English) Ziyang (in Chinese) Ziyang (in English) zzy (in English, abbreviation for Zhao Ziyang)
Chinese Politics
17th party congress Babaoshan Beat the Central Propaganda Department Blast the Central Propaganda Department Block the road and demand back pay Chief of the Finance Bureau Children of high officials China liberal (in English) Chinese Communist high officials Denounce the Central Propaganda Department Down with the Central Propaganda Department Impeach Lin Zhao Memorial Award Patriots Alliance Patriots Alliance (abbreviated) Patriots Alliance Web Police chase after and kill police Pollution lawsuit Procedures for dismissing an official Red Terror Set fires to force people to relocate Sons of high officials The Central Propaganda Department is the AIDS of Chinese society Villagers fight with weapons Wang Anshi’s reform and the fall of the Northern Song dynasty
Specifi c Issues and Events
Buy corpses Cadres transferred from the military Cashfiesta Cat abuse Changxin Coal Mountain China Youth Daily staff evaluation system Chinese orphanage Chinese Yangshen Yizhi Gong Demobilized soldiers transferred to other industries Dongyang Dongzhou Fetus soup Foot and mouth disease
Fuzhou pig case Gaoxin Hospital High-speed train petition Hire a killer to murder one’s wife Honghai Bay Horseracing Jinxin Pharmaceutical Kelemayi Linyi family planning Market access system Mascot Military wages No Friendlies Prosecutor committed suicide Pubu Ravine Shanwei government Suicide of deputy mayor Suicide of Kuerle mayor Swiss University of Finance Taishi village Top ten worst cities Wanzhou Weitan Zhang Chunxian welcomes supervision against corruption
Falun Gong
Terms related to the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, including phrases from its “Nine Commentaries” manifesto against the Communist Party : Chinese Communist Party brutally kills people dajiyuan (in English) Defy the heavens, earth and nature. Mao Zedong Epoch Times Epoch Times (written with a different character) Epoch Times news Web site Evaluate the Chinese Communist Party Evaluate the Chinese Communist Party (abbreviated) falundafa (in English) flg (in English) Fozhan Qianshou Fa Guantong Liangji Fa In the Chinese Communist Party, common standards of humanity don’t exist Li Hongzhi lihongzhi (in English) Master Li minghui (in English) Mother and daughter accused each other, and students and teachers became enemies New Tynasty TV Station
Zhidian Jiangshan Forum Zhongshan Wind and Rain Forum
Taiwan
Establish Taiwan Country Movement Organization Great President Chen Shui-bian Independent League of Taiwan Youth Independent Taiwan Association New Party Taiwan Freedom League Taiwan Political Discussion Zone
Ethnic Minorities
East Turkestan East Turkestan (abbreviated) Han-Hui conflicts Henan Zhongmu Hui rebellion Hui village Langcheng Gang Nancheng Gang Nanren Village Tibet independence Xinjiang independence Zhongmu County
Tiananmen Square
Memoirs of June 4 participants Redress June 4 Tiananmen videotape Tiananmen incident Tiananmen massacre Tiananmen generation World Economic Herald
Censorship
Cleaning and rectifying Web sites China’s true content Internet commentator News blockade
International
Indonesia North Korea falls out with China Paris riots Tsunami
Other
Armageddon Bomb Bug Handmade pistol Nuclear bomb Wiretap Chinese People Tell the Truth Chinese People Justice and Evil China Social Progressive Party Chinese Truth Report Dazhong Zhenren Zhenshi Jingdongriji Night talk of the Forbidden City People’s Inside Information and Truth
The company will use all legal means to resist demands for censorship. The company will only comply with such demands if required to do so through legally binding procedures.
Users will be clearly informed when the company has acceded to legally binding government requests to filter or otherwise censor content that the user is trying to access.
Users should be informed about the company’s data retention practices, and the ways in which their data is shared with third parties.
The company will document all cases where legally-binding censorship requests have been complied with, and that information will be publicly available.
Required Vote Approval of the stockholder proposal requires the affirmative “FOR” vote of a majority of the votes cast on the proposal. Unless marked to the contrary, proxies received will be voted “AGAINST” the stockholder proposal.
Recommendation Our board of directors recommends a vote AGAINST the stockholder proposal.
Appendix III: ChaCha and JingJing^59
Cyber Police to Guard all Shenzhen Websites
Shenzhen police plan to equip all Shenzhen Websites and electronic bulletin board systems with two virtual policemen icons on the main pages to maintain order in cyber space.
People may click the two cartoon policemen to enter the cyber space (http://66110.qzone.qq.com, http://777110. qzone.qq.com ) of two virtual cops and ask questions about information safety. Real policemen will answer their questions immediately.
Internet users may also learn information about the Internet laws and regulations and some typical Internet criminal cases from these two virtual policemen.
“The two dummy policemen were made to remind Netizens the Internet is protected by the law. People should pay attention to their behavior when they are surfing on the Net,” a senior official of the Shenzhen cyber police told China Youth Daily.
(^59) “Cyber Police to Guard All Shenzhen Websites”. Shanghai Daily. (January 5, 2006). Available from http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/154200.htm. Retrieved on November 6, 2007.
